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THE PARADOX OF CONCEPTUAL DETERMINATION

*Abstract*

The article endorses a radical criticism of the conceptualistic view about experience as a wholly-immediately conceptualized state, and it provides, at this purpose, two conceptual claims. The first one derives all its force from an operational isomorphism between the structure of the well-known F. Fitch-J. Kvanvig' *knowability paradox*, stated within the demonstration of Fitch theorem, (by which  $p = \text{every truth is knowable}$  iff  $\text{every truth is known}$  is a logical truth) and another one, which we suggest to define as *paradox of conceptual undetermination*. By means of this tool it is always possible to find an isomorphic statement to  $p$ , as  $q = \text{every empirical content is conceptualizable}$  iff  $\text{every empirical content is conceptualized}$ , which has the same troubles as  $p$ , owing to two different and peculiar logical properties of *factivity* and *conjunction's distributivity*, which (as well showed by N. Tennant and J. Kvanvig) are *always present* within the *knowledge*, conceived as a logical operator. So, under the assumption of intrinsic presence of conceptualization in every epistemic state of mind (following the same McDowell' thesis), once we have stated the presence of the same properties in conceptualization, we should conclude that every conceptualization too has the same fatal trend to fall in a self-contradiction caused by these two properties indeed. In this case, as far as for knowledge, the only main way to avoid self-deceit is to deny the knowability thesis (every truth is knowable), also for conceptualization as well the only device to avoid contradiction is to deny conceptualism, i.e. *every empirical content is always conceptualizable*. The final claim completes the article's task with a description of the phenomenological roots of our common sense bias-image of a "immediate activation" of concepts in every act of our consciousness, trying to show why it sounds to our "consciousness intuition" so good. To outline this framework, theoretical criteria of *conceptualization of conscious content* are given, following G. Evans e T. Crane' insight about the nature of consciousness of belief and imagination.