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*Abstract*

The emergence of mind from body is one of the topical subjects of the modern Philosophy of Mind. The present paper analyses how this problem – according to Mach and Uexküll – can be connected with a naturalization of knowledge. Both scientists pointed out that knowledge and science result from a long natural development: they would originate from body and sensibility; in this case scientific instruments are nothing else but a supplementary sensory, that modifies the body itself and its sensibility.

According to this, scientific instrumentation and knowledge itself have a very restricted power: suggested from the 19<sup>th</sup> German physiologist Johannes Müller (and strongly influenced from the debate about *a priori* conditions of knowledge in the late 19<sup>th</sup> German Philosophy), Uexküll points out that the function of the organisme, *through its organ senses*, is to select an adapted nature; the senses represent the way to create this form of adaptation. Indeed the Müllerian principle of specific sense energies (for instance: the eye feels any stimulus as light sensation) showed the sensibility have an active rule in the process of representation and in knowledge. That means, organisms with a different sensory-organization feel a different world. Then – according to Mach – knowledge and science are an adaptive answer to human needs: as well as each sense organ, scientific instruments – theoretical and material knowledge instrumentation – can feel all, but in a ‘specific manner’, depending on their structure. They represent and depict a sight, a perspective (*Seite*), not an exhaustive part (*Teil*) of the world. The world itself is given as an infinite variety of perspectives, each one deep-rooted in its sensory, in its ‘body’, in its nature – each one as a quite different adaptive answer to its *Umwelt* and as a form of it.