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PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE IN JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ

*Abstract*

Łukasiewicz is better-known as a logician than as a philosopher: in this essay we outline synthetically the second aspect of his intellectual activity in the Lwow-Warsaw School.

In its first stage, Łukasiewicz's philosophical meditation is influenced by his teacher Twardowski, when he wants to develop a theory of objects in general and of the necessary relations among their properties, just like in Aristotle's and Scholastic's meaning.

In this sense Łukasiewicz deals with the examination of the concept of causality and to this end he discriminates abstract ideal objects from abstract real objects. Besides, in this stage Łukasiewicz accepts a genetic inductivism based on generalization that lets us reach abstract concepts though refusing the possibility of reaching a degree of inductive confirmation based on the calculus of probability.

In the following stages of his thought Łukasiewicz tried to operate a reform of philosophy with the use of logic, without assuming a negative attitude. In this sense he differs from the Vienna Circle: according to Łukasiewicz, the philosophical problems are real problems that must be solved and not dissolved by considering them a nonsense.

A clear instance of this is given by the problem of determinism, solved by Łukasiewicz in favour of an indeterminism and formulating to this end his polyvalent logic calculus. For this purpose he also tries to elaborate in a new sense the conceptualization of science, outlining its creative nature, its capability of constructing ideal beings and, finally, its not merely reproductive function of reality.

In this stage he refuses his own genetic inductivism and accepts a hypothetical and conjectural conception very close to Popper's one: also according to Łukasiewicz, the scientific peculiarity of hypothesis consists in the possibility of being falsified by the application of Modus Tollens. Anyway, this particular issue is no more developed by him, as his interest in logic and the history of logic prevail over his typically epistemological interests.