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ON EXISTENCE OF NOT PERCEIVED OBJECTS

*Abstract*

The question if the objects we don't observe exist has been often raised in inquiries about the concept of reality. Among the others, Reichenbach, and his former pupil Putnam, insistently tried to deepen the issue.

The experimental research in psychology of perception makes clear that not observed objects don't represent the core of the problem regarding how we usually decide that things exist, and are real. In every such instances, our decisions depend on conjectures suggested and tested much more with reference to our preexisting knowledge than to evidence. As for the latter, as a rule, we built up our judgments on the basis of only few factual features, as long as they match our expectations. Thus, also the so-called "observed" objects, in a great measure, are not actually observed but, much more, probabilistically inferred.

In principle, the probabilistic inferential nature of perception applies both to observed objects as much as not observed ones. Only as a consequence it is understandable why people trust the reality not only of not observed objects but furthermore of those which are unobservable. The Reichenbach-Salmon criterion depicts the underlying mental mechanism, consisting in considering the inverse ratio of probability of correlations as a measure of probability of a common, real cause for their occurrence.