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FRANZ BRENTANO'S AND ANTON MARTY'S
THEORY OF THETIC AND DOUBLE JUDGEMENTS

Abstract

Brentano and Marty developed a logical theory paradigmatically different from Frege's. In this paper, the distinction between thetic and double judgements is analysed on the basis of the simple/complex opposition. For Brentano and Marty, judgements are not divided into subject and predicate but into matter and form, each of which has its own copula (and relative negation). From this follows rejection of the thesis that the singular judgement must have an individual concept as its subject, because individuation concerns not the subject as such, but the entire matter of the judgement. Modifying this aspect of the judgement entails the complementary modification of the predicate as well. If the subject does not necessarily have to be an individual concept, the predicate may not be the linguistic expression of a universal. Secondly, Brentano's and Marty's logic is also an attempt to analyse pronouns, perhaps the weakest point of traditional logic.