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THE LIAR TO THE TURING'S TEST

Abstract

This paper is divided into two parts.

In the first one we maintain the thesis, that it makes sense to distinguish between the actions described by the expressions “to voluntarily deceive” and “to lie”. Here we are posing the ability to lie at the crossroad of two mental abilities: to voluntarily deceive and to use, in a logical way, a highly developed language.

Starting from a simplified but reasonable definition of the expression “to lie”, and deriving from it some interesting consequences, we come to the claim that the action of lying is a fundamental example of “general intelligence”, in the sense of Newell and Simon, a notion which is at the basis of A.I.. Among the arguments in favour of this thesis, we show that the ability to lie is required as a necessary, implicit condition to pass the so-called Turing test.

In the second part of the paper, we firstly discuss a peculiar aspect of the classical Epimenide's paradox, namely the falsehood paradox. Starting from this discussion, and pointing on the controversial relationship between truth and information, we finally provide a *real* liar's paradox: “if E asserts that E is lying, then E is lying or not according to the fact that E believes that he is not lying or he is lying”.